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MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN RECOVERY
IN THE endless round of activities that make up economic
life all economic agents are both buyers and sellers—buyers
of goods for consumption, fabrication or sale, buyers of
services for personal or business use, sellers of goods or ser-
vices to be used at some stage of the productive-distributive
process. All economic agents, then, stand between the shears
of buying and selling prices, and are affected by unequal
changes in these two sets of prices. Yet the consequences of
unequal changes are brought home most immediately to two
business groups—merchants and manufacturers. For these
groups buying and selling price relations take the form of
definite margins, price differentials relating to a specific unit
of the commodities handled. When the connection isless
direct, as between wage earnings and living costs, or farm
income and average cost of goods purchased by farmers, the
ultimate economic consequences of unequal changes may be
no less important. But because the connection is less direct
and obvious, the economic repercussions of shifting relations
are likely to be less certain and less sharply focused. The
physical processes of the economy may be expected to reflect
price movements most immediately, and in the most directly
measurable way, in the activities of merchants and manu-
facturers. These activities are far more directly motivated by
specific price relations than are the activities of other classes
of economic agents. In merchandising and manufacturing
the calculus of business, which is a profit calculus, may be286 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
applied on a unit basis, and corresponding action may be
promptly taken to modify the number of units handled.
By virtue of thus standing midway in the stream of trade
that flows from original producer to final consumer, and of
buying and selling on a strictly business basis, manufacturing
industries possess certain distinctive attributes which affect
their activities during the cyclical Fluctuations of business.
But other circumstances contribute to the operating charac-
teristics of manufacturing enterpri:;e. Relatively heavy in-
vestment in plant and equipment is a condition of operation
in nearlyall manufacturing industries. Fixed overhead
charges are an important element of total costs of produc-
tion. Substantial changes in volume of goods produced may
bring very considerable variations in cost per unit, because
of the necessity of dividing a fixed total of overhead charges
among a varying number of units. Such overhead charges,
too, are usually difficult to adapt to changing monetary val-
ues, because they may rest upon fixed, contractual claims. A
sharp fall in prices may thus bring considerable advances in
the real burden of overhead costs, just as a sharp price rise
may lower the real burden of overhead. This circumstance
has gained in importance in recent years, because of the
growth of fixed charges in manufacturing with the increased
use of equipment and non-human power.1
1Ini8gg overhead costs plus profits approximately 24.8 per cent
ofthe selling price of each unit of manufactured goods produced in the
United States. The corresponding figure in was 28.8 per cent.
The increase of capital investment in manufacturing industries is of im-
portance, in connection with the problem of readjustment under conditions
of recession and depression, primarily because it involves an increase in the
relatively fixed obligations of manufacturing enterprises. (When the capital
investment is based upon a loan, the obligation is definitely fixed. When
financed through stock issue, or effected through investment of surplus,
the obligation is less rigid, but it may nevertheless be a strong influence
upon a board of directors, striving to maintain an established dividend rate.)
This is a phase of a problem with numerow. ramifications. Changes in theMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 287
The point last made is a phase of a broader condition af-
fecting the activities of manufacturing enterprises. The dif-
ferent elements contributing to the final selling price of
manufactured products(i.e., labor, material and overhead
costs) vary greatly in their sensitivity to the diverse market
and monetary forces that affect the values of goods and
services. In part, this is a reflection of the varying flexibility
of these price and cost factors.2 In part, it reflects differences
in the degree to which forces impinging upon the price sys-
tem from the outside(e.g., monetary forces) affect the
ments of that system. This is in some degree a matter of
original incidence, in some degree a question of varying
institutional frictions. All these factors interact to yield a
system of prices and of costs among manufacturing industries
that is marked by extreme differences of behavior, especially
during a period when volume of production and monetary
values are undergoing violent changes. In the fact that the
elements of this system differ widely in their power of adap-.
tation to changed circumstances is found a major cause of
economic and retarded activity after a severe
business recession.
The possibility of fairly rapid changes in the productivity
capital structures of industrial establishments doubtless affect the financial
and operating policies of management in many ways. The mental reactions
of boards of directors to changes in balance sheets and income accounts are
involved, as well as the physical and monetary problems arising directly out
of heavier capital investment.
The liquidity of fixed capital, in the sense of convertibility into money,
is perhaps somewhat lower, as physical plants become larger, more durable
and, in some respects, more specialized in their uses. But such liquidity was
never high.
2Theterm flexibility is here used in the technical sense in which it defines
the relation between a relative change in price and a corresponding relative
change in physical quantities. The coefficient of flexibility of priceisa
measure of the same type as the coefficient of elasticity of demand, except
that it is derived from an equation in which price is the dependent variable.288 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
of labor and in production costs in manufacturing industries
is another factor bearing upon the behavior of these indus-
tries during recession and revival.Various circumstances
may give rise to increased industrial productivity. The mere.
closing of inefficient plants, removal of inefficient equip-
ment, discharge of inefficient officers or workers will serve
to enhance the average productivity of plants and equipment
in use, although the real efficiency cf the plants, equipment
and men left in operation may remain unchanged.3 Again,
there is almost always a margin of unused resourcefulness
and efficiency in any manufacturing plant that is likely to be
exploited under the pressure of emergency. Men will work
harder, more care will be taken, internal organization will
be improved, wastes will be avoided, during lean years. Of
a different order are those increases in productivity definitely
attributable to technical advance and the installation of
better equipment. The progl'ess of invention, alone, may
bring these gains. Pressure from high labor costs may serve
as a stimulating factor, when technical innovations will re-
duce labor requirements. The rapidity with which produc-
tivity may change among manufacturing industries is per-
B This statement perhaps suggests a sharp line of division between inefficient
and efficient plants, equipment and personnd, with inefficient units being
weeded out by depression and efficient units going blithely forward. This, of
course, was not the case. Among the plants :hat were closed(the number
of manufacturing establishments in the United States, excluding those with
products valued at less than annually, declined from 209,862 in 1929
to141,769 1933) were doubtless many efficientunits. The
rains of depression fall alike on the just and the unjust. And many
inefficient plants, instruments and men survived the depression. But the
economically weakest units (a group generally, though not entirely, cotermi-
nous with the least efficient, technically) were the most severely hit by the
depression. Many factors contributed to the notable advance in productivity
that came during the depression years; the raising of the average level of
productive efficiency through the elimination of marginal elements was one
of these.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 289
hapsnotgenerallyappreciated. Thus the records indicate
that from 1921 to 1923 the output of manufacturing indus-
tries in the United States, per wage earner employed, in-
creased 14.8 per cent. This gain represented, in considerable
part, the realization of new productive opportunities opened
up by the use of methods and equipment installed during
the recession and depression immediately preceding. (The
apparent gain in per capita output from 1919 to 1921, in
manufacturing industries of the United States, was o.8 per
cent.4 The real effect of new installations was felt during the
ensuing two years.) The gain from 1921to1923isthe more
striking in that 192 i was a year of depression, when the less
efficient equipment was presumably idle, while 1923 was a
year of greater activity, when all grades of equipment were
more generally employed. The possibility of rapid changes
in the productivity of manufacturing industries, stimulated
by the pressure of depression, of high productive costs, of
strong competition, or by the promise of wide markets if
costs and prices may be substantially reduced, is a dynamic
factor of tremendous importance in the cost structure of
industry. Here, under modern conditions, is a force that
may bring wide shifts in price and cost relations in manu-
facturing industries within a short period.5
Measurements of per capita output are not accurate indexes of industrial
productivity during periods when hours of work are being altered. Part of
the true gain in productivity from igig to 1921isnot shown by these figures,
because of the reduction of working hours in 1921.Anincrease of working
hours from 1921to1923leadsto an opposite error, of over-statement, for
this period. The actual gain from9i9to1923wasprobably close to that
shown by the figures cited, but the increase in productivity was greater
from igig to 1921andless from 1921to1923thanthe per capita measure-
ments indicate.
5Productivitychanges in single industries are more striking than the averages
for all manufacturing industries. Some examples are cited below:
(Footnoteconcluded on p. 290)290 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
Finally, we should note the place of manufacturing indus-
tries in the domestic economy of the United States. Of
approximately 44 million persons gainfully engaged 6 in the
United States1929, slightly more than io million, or 23
per cent, were engaged in manufacturing industries; in the
same year 23 per cent of the total income paid out (i8 out
of 79 million dollars) came from manufacturing industries.
These industries, of course, are of central importance as em-
ployers of labor, consumers of domestically produced raw
materials, and disbursers of purchasing power. Disorganiza-
tion and subnormal activity in manufacturing affect all other
elements of the economic system.
PROBLEMS OF RECOVERY IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
The condition of manufacturing industries, after the de-
cline that began in 1929, was discus;ed in Chapter IlL Four
years of price recession, paralleled by a somewhat broken but
still more severe drop in volume of production, left these
(Footnote 5




Iron and steel, blast furnaces +51.3
Coke, not including gas-house +50.0




Condensed and evaporated milk +42.2
6 This figure, which is based upon estimates made in the study of national
income, includes employed workers and entrepreneurs actually participating
in productive activity. The number of persons partially employed is reduced
to an equivalent number of fully employed. The total given is smaller than
the Census enumeration of persons gainfully occupied, which includes all
persons who usually follow a gainful occupation.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 291
industries in a position of extreme difficulty in the winter of
1932—33. Activity was at a low ebb. The volume of output
was barely half of that produced prior to the recession. The
drastic decline of commodity values brought painful prob-
lems of readjustment. The buying prices of manufacturers
(costs of materials and supplies) fell to low levels, but there
were numerous obstacles to the prompt adjustment of sell-
ing prices to these levels. Long-term commitments affecting
rental and interest payments, salary and wage scales fixed by
agreement or long-established custom, the effect upon man-
agerial minds of the increase in overhead charges assessable
to each unit of the reduced output of manufactured goods,
and other obstacles growing out of human reluctance to
recognize and accept the implications of the change in the
value of the dollar all served to retard readjustment in the
field of prices. The effects of these changes were felt through-
out the economic system, intensifying other elements of
economic distress. The decline of manufacturing employ-
ment, the fall in manufacturing pay rolls and the curtail-
ment of dividend payments sharply reduced the purchasing
power of those drawing their incomes from manufacturing
industries. The failure of the prices of manufactured goods
to drop equally with those of raw materials and with the
incomes of primary producers meant that the purchasing
power of primary producers was reduced, in the markets for
manufactured goods. The volume of trade and the standards
of living of important elements of the population were in-
evitably lowered.
Our immediate concern is with the course and character of
recovery, as it affected the manufacturing industries of the
United States from the early months of '933 to the spring
of 1936. The problems of recovery in this sector of the eco-
nomic system grew, in part, out of the particular situation
left by recession, in part out of the inherent attributes of292 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
manufacturing industries as a class, and in part out of the
special conditions created by legislative enactments and ad-
ministrative procedure during this period. It will be well to
summarize certain of these before turning to the
record of recent changes.
The major problems of manufacturing producers, in the
winter of 1932—33,centeredabout the restoration of volume
of production and sales, and the widening of the margin be-
tween costs (including overhead costs) and selling prices. As
we have seen, the differential between the costs of raw ma-
terials and the selling prices of manufactured goods had not
declined, during the preceding recession, by an amount com-
mensurate with the increase in the purchasing power of
money. Relatively to prices in general, the costs of fabrica-
tion had risen. (This relative advance was in part obscured
by quality reductions and by shifts to goods in lower price
classes.) On this basis alone the price position of manufactur-
ing industries was favorable to profits. But the tremendous
drop in volume of production (a drop of 51percent from
July 1929toFebruary 1933)hadincreased the relative bur-
den of overhead costs. Such costs, in the aggregate, had been
greatly extended during the pre-recession expansion, and as
a result the per unit burden was particularly heavy when
volume of output was curtailed. Labor costs per unit of
product had been cut much more rigorously than overhead
costs, but the reduction was distinctly less than that in ma-
terial costs. Thus the recession brought, concurrently, a rela-
tive widening of the differential between material costs and
selling price, which represents the cost of fabrication to the
final consumer, and a sharp contraction of the differential
between total costs and selling price, which represents the
possibilities of profits to the In 1931,infact,
this latter differential was negative, for manufacturing indus-
tries as a class. Greater volume and, if possible, lower fabrica-MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 293
tionalcosts were the obvious remedies for the difficulties of
manufacturing producers.
But behind the rather narrow problem that presented it-
self to the individual manufacturer lay the whole tangled
situation that grew out of the preceding expansion and re-
cession. Intergroup trade had been seriously impaired by
the uneven incidence of recession, with the prices and pur-
chasing power of primary producers fallen, to.abnormally low
levels and with the prices of manufactured goods so high,
relatively, as to preclude a normal volume of sales. Evidence
provided by the persistent unemployment of productive fac-
tors, by the reduced volume of production and trade, by the
rapidity and violence of the changes that had brought about
this situation indicated that these price relations represented
true disparities, rather than permanent shifts in pre-existing
relations. Correction of this schism through the raising of
raw material prices relatively to the prices of manufactured
goods seemed to be a necessary condition of restored activity.
This problem was related to matters of another sort, hav-
ing to do with industrial productivity and production costs
in manufacturing industries. Lower costs offered a means of
widening the profit differential and increasing the sales of
manufacturing industries. The pressure towards greater effi-
ciency and reduced production costs was unremitting, under
the stress of depression and during the first stages of recovery.
But this was not merely a problem of productive technique.
Costs were high, in part, because of the heritage of overhead
charges from the days of high prices and hectic plant expan-
sion that preceded the recession. The cutting of these charges,
as well as the improvement of technique and the stepping-up
of the pace of plant activity, was entailed in the reduction of
costs.
Price readjustment, with a reduction
of theincrease of294 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
productivity and the lowering of fabricational costs—these
were promising possibilities in the direction of recovery for
manufacturing industries. From these there might be ex-
pected an enhancement of the purchasing power of primary
producers, a pick-up in the volume of intergroup trade (i.e.,
between primary producers and manufacturing groups), and
increases of employment and of the wage and dividend dis-
bursements of manufacturing industries.
In this general program were several sets of possible con-
flicts. The degree to which employment might increase with
an increase in the output and sales of manufacturing indus-
tries depended, in part, on the degree to which productivity
had advanced in these industries. For increasing productivity
would, in its first impact, work against expansion of employ-
ment. Later, the lower costs and lower prices that enhanced
productivity might bring would be expected to stimulate
employment. Again, heavy wage d:isbursements on the part
of manufacturing industries would augment the purchasing
power of their employees, and thu:; stimulate general recov-
ery. If such disbursements, however, entailed advances in
labor costs per unit of goods produced, this would be in
conflict with the reduction of costs required to bring the
relatively high selling prices of manufactured goods into line
with general prices. In following the actual course of re-
covery attention must be given to these possible conflicts.
The problems we have mentioned are mainly, of course,
those that arise after any recession that has altered the pre-
existing conditions of activity. They were acute in 1932and
1933becauseof the exceptional severity of the recession and
because of certain unusual characteristics of the preceding
period of expansion. In addition, some altogether novel is-
•sues arose out of the administration, of the recovery program.
To a greater degree than in any previous depression in our
history a conscious program, directed towards the correctionMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 295
of the economic ills of the day, was applied. On the mone-
tary side price recovery was sought through departure from
the gold standard, a gold-buying program and devaluation
of the dollar. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act
hours were limited, minimum wages were set and provision
made for the control of prices over a wide range of industrial
activity. Under the Agricultural Adjustment Act processing
taxes were levied on important fabricational operations. The
effects of this program on the production costs and selling
prices of manufacturing industries, on their wage disburse-
ments and on their production and sales are matters of spe-
cial interest. Of course, the actual consequences of many of
the actions taken in applying the recovery program are
clouded and uncertain; it is often impossible to distinguish
specific consequences of given actions. But the picture of
recovery as a whole must include the conscious program, as
well as the unplanned aspects of revival among manufactur-
ing industries.
PRICE CHANGES AMONG MANUFACTURED GOODS AND RAW
MATERIALS
We are concerned in this section with those price rela-
tions that affect the costs and profits of manufacturing indus-
tries. With respect to raw materials, then, we restrict our-
selves to materials that are actually used in the processes of
manufacture, excluding that important class of products go-
ing to final consumers in a raw state. Price changes during
recession and in the subsequent price advance are summa-
rized in Table 33. At the low point of the depression the
prices of raw materials intended for fabrication were 51per
cent below their pre-recession values; the selling prices of
manufactured goods had fallen, on the average, only 31 per
cent. These values represent a notable widening of the fab-296 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ricational margin, reduced to per unit terms. The actual ex-
change situation at this low point is perhaps most strikingly
defined by the ratio between these prices. At prices prevail-
ing in February 1933 producers of raw materials for fabrica-
tion were obliged to give 41 per cent more, by volume, than
in July 1929 for a constant quantity of finished goods made
from their materials. The five months of rapid price change
following, during which raw producers' goods advanced 31
TABLE 33
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANUFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS, JULY 1936
RAW PRODUCERS' GOODS AND MAmJFACTURED GOODS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr.June
.1929.193319331933 t93419341935 1935 .1936 .1936
RECESSIONAND RECOVERY
Producers' goods, rawioo496465 687680797978





Manufactured goods, all ioo112117120123125127124122
per cent andmanufactured goods advanced 12 percent in
price, reduced this ratio to 1.20. Inthe ten succeedingmonths
the rate of advance in raw materials was checked; prices of
processed goods continued to move upwards. The ratio de-
fining exchange relations rose to Drought, in the sum-
mer of 1934, gave a new stimulus to :he prices of agricultural
products, and by September the ratio of the prices of manu-
factured goods to the prices of raw producers' goods had
fallen to 1.1 1. Minor movements during the nineteen months
following further reduced the manufacturing differential.
The exchange ratio in June 1936 Wa:; still unfavorable to raw
materials, relatively to the pre-recession situation, but the
excess volume of raw materials ex(:hanging for a constantMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 297
quantity of fabricated goods had fallen from 41 per cent in
February 1933 to 8 per cent. Here was a notable shift, in-
deed.7
These changes appear in somewhat different perspective
when a more distant base is used (Table 34). The picture of
TABLE 34
CHANGESIN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANUFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS, 1913-1936
RAw PRODUCERS' GOODS AND MANUFACTURED GOODS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr. June






tured to raw 1.001.141.591.361.411.371.281.231.251.231.23
alternate expansion and contraction of the fabricational mar-
gin, shown in Table 33, is repeated here, but with the dif-
ference that recession starts with a margin already relatively
wide. In July 1929 the average prices of manufactured goods
were 53 per cent above their 1913 average; average prices of
raw producers' goods were but 34 per cent higher. Thus, in
7Twoother movements, not directly reflected in the measurements given
above, played a part in the trade movements of recovery. In the early months
of recovery the actual rise in the prices of manufactured goods probably
exceeded the advance indicated by quoted prices. For at the low point of
the depression, as a result of undercover price-cutting, realized prices were
in many cases lower than those currently quoted. The firstfive or six
months of revival brought not only the price increases indicated by the
quoted prices, but additional advances from the low levels of the cut prices.
In 1934 and 1935 there was also a movement on the part of consumers
back to goods of higher quality than those purchased during the worst
months of the depression. This would not affect the quoted prices, but it
would tend to raise the prices realized by manufacturers by higher per-
centages than those given in Table Notuntil Census data are
available willit be possible to estimate the relative importance of these
factors, in causing divergent movements of realized and quoted prices.298 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
exchange for a constant quantitymanufactured goods 14
percent more, by volume, had to be given by primary
producers in 1929thanin 1913.Subsequentchanges with
reference to the 1913baseare thus more pronounced than
when measured on the July 1929base.The final records for
June 1936 indicate that the prices of raw producers' goods
were 4 per cent above their pre-War level, the prices of manu-
factured goods 28 per cent above t:iat level, while the ratio
defining exchange relations was 1.23. The wide disparity of
the winter of 1932—33 had been reduced, but the prices of
these two classes of goods were stilSi far removed from their
pre-War relations.
These changes in the relations between the prices of raw
producers' goods and the prices of the manufactured goods
into which they enter are the more striking when compared
with the shifts during a period of similar length prior to
the War. Between 1891 and 1913theprices of raw producers'
goods in wholesale markets rose, on the average, 23 per cent;
prices of manufactured goods advanced i ipercent. The
ratio defining the exchange relations between goods of these
classes declined from i.00 to.90.Thatis, the volume of raw
producers' goods required in exchange for a constant quantity
of manufactured goods declined io per cent from 1891 to
1913.Between1913andJune 1936 this quantity increased
23 per cent. The sustained pre-War tendency towards a cheap-
ening of manufactured goods, relatively to raw materials,
stands in clear contrast to the post-War tendency towards
the cheapening of raw materials.
In interpreting this apparent shift the limitations of our
measurements must be kept in mind. To the extent that
quality changes have occurred among the manufactured
goods represented in the standard quotations entering into
the price index numbers cited, these index numbers are in
error. There have been such changes, with considerableMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
improvements in the quality of the finished goods bought by
final consumers. The difficulty of evaluating these
ments and securing series of prices for finished goods truly
comparable with the prices of rawmaterialsis a serious
impediment to an accurate review of the changing relations
among producing groups.
Striking as these quality changes have been for certain
classes of goods, such as automobiles, there is no reason to
believe that the quality of finished consumers' goods as a
broad class was improved between 1913and1936toa degree
sufficient to offset the price shift noted. The exchange value
of primary products fell and that of finished consumers' goods
rose between these years. The consequences of this shift have
been far reaching.
Before attempting to appraise these movements we should
trace the incidence of recovery in somewhat greater detail, as
it affected related groups of raw producers' goods and of
processed goods. Measurements for certain of these groups
are given in Table 35. The relations between the prices of
processed goods and raw materials in the several groups, at
the low point of the recession, are perhaps most effectively
summarized by the ratios given with each set of comparisons.
The greater the ratio, of course, the wider is the price mar-
gin between raw and processed goods and the less favorable
is the trading position of primary producers.8 For crops and
8Hereand elsewhere the argument of this monograph proceeds on the
assumption that the 'trading position' of a producing group may be defined
in terms of relative prices. For a fully accurate definition of trading position
account should be taken of other factors (such as productivity, average and
marginal production costs, volume of production and sales, etc.). But price
relations constitute a major factor in the fixing of trade positions. Changes
in trading positions over the relatively short periods covered by a business
cycle are predominantly influenced by changes in price relations. Over
longer periods changes in trading position may not be so accurately defined
in terms of relative selling prices.300 PRICESIN RECESSION A.ND RECOVERY
TABLE 35
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANUFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS, JULY 1c)29-JUNE 1936
CRoPs, ANIMAL PRODUCTS AND MINERAL PRODUCTS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr. June
19291933 1933 1933 1934 1934 1935 1935 1936 1936
RECESSIONAND RECOVERY
Crops





Producers' raw ioo 46434553 71 7473









Producers' raw 100 7879828283858584
Processed ioo8i8i go8887878787
Ratio, processed













Processed 100101 112109io8io8io8io8MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 301
animal products the ratios in February 1933 are not far
apart—i.71 and 1.59.Producers of raw mineral products
were in a stronger position, with a ratio of 1.14. After the first
five months of swift recovery, during which raw farm crops
advanced 72 per cent in price, raw animal products 38 per
cent and raw minerals io per cent, these ratios were sub-
stantially reduced. For raw crops and animal products the
next ten months witnessed a reversal of these movements.
While the prices of raw products lost ground, or barely main-
tained the July 1933 level, processed goods continued to
advance and the ratios defining the exchange relations be-
tween raw and processed goods rose. Only for minerals did
the ratio continue to fall, reaching i.oi in May
Four months of drought and crop destruction again re-
versed the situation; the prices of raw crops rose sharply and
the ratio of the average price index numbers of processed
and raw crops, on the July 1929 base, fell to 1.10. In June
1936 this ratio stood at 1.17. For animal products the initial
gain brought by the drought was much smaller, but drought
and production limitation had important after effects. Prices
advanced sharply in the early months of 1935, and most of
these gains were held. The price ratio of processed goods
to raw materials, for animal products, was i.i6 in June 1936,
as against values of unity in July 1929, 1.59 in February
1933.
Still greater alterations occurred in the ratios between the
indexes of prices of processed products and raw materials,
with reference to a pre-War year. The ratios in Table 36
define the degree of cheapening of raw materials, in relation
to the processed goods into which they enter. They may also
9Thesubgroup measurements indicate that raw metals were still at some
disadvantage, in May 1934.Non-metallicminerals are not listed as a separate
division, since the raw and processed goods included in this category are not
strictly comparable.302 PRICES IN RECESSION ANDRECOVERY
TABLE36
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANUFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS, 1913-1936
C&ops, ANIMAL PRODUCTS AND MINERAL PRODUCTS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr.June
19131929 1933 1933 1933 1934 1934 1935 1935 1936 1936
Crops
Producers' rawioo 52 90 88110io8979898
Processed 100143 93117 123128129130121120
Ratio, proc.
essed to raw i.oo1.051.791.30 1.40i.i61.191.341.231.22
Aiiiinalproducts
Producers' raw ioo1485068 66 79io6110io8
Processed ioo16791105 117126137143137133
Ratio, proc-





essed to raw t.oo1.131.301.211.121.141.121.11i.oSi.o8i.o8
Metals





beinterpreted as measures of the changing physical quanti-
ties of raw producers' goods required in exchange for fixed
quantities of the manufactured goods into which the given
raw materials enter, Since the vicissitudes of the last seven
years have already been traced, our present interest attaches
to the entries for the last months recorded.
Reduction in relative value, wfth reference to the 1913
base,was more extreme in June 1936 for animal products
than for the two other main grOUPSrepresented.In thisMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 303
month 29 per cent more than in 1913, by volume, had to
be given by producers of raw animal products in exchange
for a fixed quantity of the same goods in fabricated form.
The corresponding figure for the low month of the depres-
sion was 82 per cent. For farm crops a 79 per cent disability,
in February 1933, had been reduced to one of 22 per cent.
Among minerals the June 1936 ratio was i.o8 as against 1.30
at the depression low. Raw metals, however, were much
cheaper than minerals as a class, relatively to their processed
forms. The June 1936 index was io8 (with 1913 as ioo), as
compared with 143 for processed metal products. The ex-
change ratio was 1.32.
The effects of recovery on manufacturing differentials
among farm and non-farm products are defined more sharply
in Table 37. We have already noted the widening of the dif-
ferential between the prices of farm products in raw and
processed form during the recession. While processed goods
fell 40 per cent, raw producers' goods of this class fell 63 per
cent, the ratio between the two increasing from 1 .oo to 1.62
between July 1929 and February 1933. Within the ensuing
forty months the prices of these raw materials advanced 97
per cent; prices of processed farm products rose 39 per cent.
The ratio between them was reduced from 1.62 tO1.15.
Here was a very substantial gain indeed. In contrast, the
records for raw and processed goods not originating on
American farms show no such declines during recession, and
much smaller advances during recovery. In June 1936 the
index numbers for these two groups, on the July 1929 base,
were 85, as compared with 72 and 83 for raw and processed
farm products. The ratio defining exchange relations be-
tween raw and processed non-farm products never rose tb
the extreme heights found among agricultural products.304 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 37
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANUFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS, JULY 1929-JUNE 1936
PRODUCTSOF AMERICANFARMS AND OTIIERPRODUCTS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr. June




Producers' raw ioo 57 567078747472
Processed ioo6o 798488908583
Ratio, processed




Producers' raw too64 8183838285 85
Processed ioo778o 86858485
Ratio, processed
to raw i.oo1.20i.o8 1.041.021.021.001.001.00
Feb. July Oct. Sept. May Dec. Apr. June











From i.oo inJuly1929thisratic advanced to 1.20atthe
low point of recession, and dropped again to i.oo in June
1936. Pre-recession exchange relations had been restored,
substantially, by 1936.(Thesefigures, of course, are averages.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 305
Formany individual commodities the relations were mark-
edly different.)
Various other classifications are of interest in tracing
changes in the fabricational margin during recovery. Our
present purpose will be served by a study of ratios relating
to four selected commodity groups. The detailed measure-
ments from which these are derived are given in Appendices
III and IV.
In July 1929 the relative prices of processed producers'
goods intended for capital equipment and processed con-
TABLE 38
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES AFFECTING MANuFACTURERS'
PRICE MARGINS AND THE TRADING RELATIONS BETWEEN
PRODUCING GROUPS, 1913-1936
GOMMOIMTY GROUPS RATIO OF INDEX OF PRICES OF PROCESSED GOODS
COMPARED TO INDEX OF PRICES OF RAW MATERIALS OR SEMI-FINISHED GOODS
July Feb. July Oct. May Sept. May Dec. Apr. June




















tion 1.001.371.971.58i.681.62i.6ii.6i1.57i.6oi.6o306 IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
sumers' goods stood ig and 21 per cent, respectively, above
the relative prices of the corresponding materials of fabrica-
tion, the reference base being 1913.Theseratios reflect the
post-War over-valuation of processed goods, relatively to
pre-War standards. When the margins opened by the price
changes of the recession are superimposed upon these earlier
differentials we have very high ratios indeed, during the
depression. In February 1933 the ratios were 1.65 and 1.77,
respectively, for capital goods and consumers' goods. By June
1936 these had fallen to 1.26 and 1.36—still substantially
greater than in 1913. In terms of i:itergroup trade, the first
of these ratios meant that producers of goods intended, after
processing, for capital equipment, had to give 26 per cent
more than in 1913, in physical volume, for a constant quan-
tity of processed capital equipment. The other ratio may be
similarly interpreted. Only very great shifts in relative pro-
ductivity and in costs of production could prevent such
changes from bringing important modifications in economic
status. There is no evidence that such compensating shifts
in productivity did occur, among the classes of goods cited.1°
Breaking the second of these categories into foods and
non-foods, we have the last two sets of ratios shown in Table
38. The divergence between the prices of unfinished and
finished goods intended for human consumption has been
most pronounced among non-foods. The persistence of rel-
atively high prices for finished goo'is in the latter group has
been the prime factor in this divergence. In February
theratio for non-foods was practica:[ly double the 1913value.
10Here,also, we should note that advances in the quality of finished goods,
if account could be taken of them, would lower these ratios. An average
unit of finished goods represented more in 1936thanin 1913,interms of
utility. For capital goods the gain in quality may have been sufficient to
offset the price disadvantage of the primary producer; this could hardly
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In terms of physical trade this meant that producers of raw
materials of this type were called upon to give twice as much
as in 1913fora constant quantity of finished goods. By June
1936,theratio had fallen to i.6o for consumers' non-foods,
a figure still very high indeed by earlier standards. Here is
one of the major changes in price relations that recent years
have brought. Relatively to the cost of raw materials, the cost
of the services performed in the manufacturing of non-food
products intended for direct human consumption and use
has increased greatly. Among foods the ratio in June 1936
was much lower, i.ii asagainst i.oo in 1913.
Inthis section we have sought to trace recent changes in
the two-sided market relations of manufacturing industries,
relations with raw material producers on the one hand, with
the buyers of manufactured goods on the other. We pass to
a more intensive study of manufacturing industries during
recovery, a review of internal operating conditions as well as
relations with outside buyers and sellers.
ON RECENT CHANGES IN PRODUCTION, PRICES, EMPLOYMENT
AND WAGES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
The low point of the depression, in manufacturing indus-
tries as in other economic activities, was reached, in the
United States, late in the winter of 1932—33."Theperiod
11 It is perhaps open to question whether this revival in the United States
should be dated from February—March 1933, or from mid-summer 1932.
The physical volume of production of producers' goods reached lower levels
in 1932 than in 1933; the number of wage earners employed was as low in
1932 as in early 1933. On the other hand, aggregate wage disbursements,
average prices at wholesale and electric power production fell to lower levels
in 1933. The domestic statistical evidence is thus conflicting, on the interest-
ing question whether the downswing that accothpanied the political uncer-
tainties of late 1932 and early marked a continuation of recession and
depression, or a check to recovery that had already started.(As regards308 PRICESIN RECOVERY
of three years that followed brought a substantial recovery.
By February—March 1936 the average selling prices of manu-
factured goods, at wholesale, had risen 25 per cent; the vol-
ume of manufacturing production had increasedper cent,
the total number of persons employed 40 per cent, and total
wage disbursements 92 per cent.
Particular interest attaches to the nature of this recovery,
because of the novel elements that played a part in it, to
which attention has already been drawn. The forces operat-
ing in the traditional revival were, in this instance, com-
pounded in complex ways with elements of a consciously
formulated program of recovery. For this reason it is of in-
terest to know whether there were in the internal proc-
esses of recovery that might have been associated with special
elements of the recovery program. Again, we may ask whether
this recovery conformed, in to the pattern of earlier
business revivals. This question is pertinent today not only
as a matter of historical interest but also because it bears
upon the probable future course of recovery. We may not
appraise current economic changes solely in relation to past
standards, but reference to these standards may illuminate
the present situation.
There are more specific questions centering about the
recovery program, as it affected manufacturing industries.
What was the effect of the novel conditions of 1933—36
industrial productivity? How were labor costs in manufactur-
ing plants affected? What increase occurred in the aggregate
purchasing power of manufacturing labor? Did this increase
differ in important ways from the customary expansion of
labor's purc.hasing power during business revival? These, and
the more general questions suggested above, deal with mat-
world conditions generally, a recovery seems to have begun in 1932.)Forthe
present purpose, itis desirable to measure changes from the low point of
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ters of major importance today, when recovery is being sought
under an intermixture of old and new conditions. Not all
these questions may be answered definitely, but their ur-
gency justifies an attempt to cull from available data evi-
dence relevant to these central issues.
This attempt has been made in preparing the measure-
ments given in this section. Certain of the items are subject
to a considerable margin of error, because of limitations upon
the coverage of the original records utilized, or because of
imperfect comparability ofseries drawn from different
sources. Recognition of this margin of error, of the ty.pe that
is present whenever representative data are employed, is
necessary in using the detailed figures given below. But the
general consistency of the results secured leaves no doubt
as to the substantial truth of the evidence drawn from these
records.
The records of recovery are to be interpreted with refer-
ence to the background of the preceding recession, as this
affected manufacturing industries. Over a period of less than
four years the physical volume of manufacturing production
had been cut in half, the average selling price of manufac-
tured products had fallen 31 per cent and the aggregate gross
income of manufacturing enterprises had been reduced al-
most two-thirds. The number of employed wage earners had
fallen approximately 43 per cent, the average hourly wage
had declined some 22 per cent and average earnings per wage
earner had dropped 39 per cent. Total wage disbursements
of manufacturing industries had declined 65 per cent; tak-
ing account of changes in living costs, this meant a loss of
approximately 50 per cent in the actual aggregate purchas-
ing power of manufacturing labor. In no recent business
recession have equal losses been suffered by manufacturing
industries. The price decline of 1920—21 exceeded the drop
of 1929—33, it is true, and in other respects the first post-War310 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
recession was of a magnitude roughly comparable to the most
recent decline. But in prolonged Severity the recession and
depression of 1929—33haveno counterpart in the economic
records of recent years. Reflections of the drastic preceding
recession will appear in the movements of recovery, which
may be dated from the early months of
Thisrecovery was spotty and uneven, probably less homo-
geneous than any similar period of economic revival of which
we have record. Relief from the immediate fears engendered
by the banking crisis, a series of developments affecting the
present and anticipated value of the dollar, the prospect, and
then the reality, of extensive in operating and mar-
keting conditions growing out of the adoption of industrial
codes, fundamental changes in the conditions affecting the
issuance of new securities and the allocation of investment
funds, the initiation of Federalenditures for relief on a
hitherto unprecedented scale—these followed one another in
rapid succession. Within three years the business 'climate'
underwent a series of changes such as might normally have
been spread over many years. These and other developments
affected the shifting course of recovery among manufacturing
industries between February andthe spring of 1936.
Thefirst sharp spurt, which carried, to mid-summer of 1933,
wasfollowed by a recession, extending to the end of
aspring revival in 1934,aset-back through the summer
months, a recovery in the winter of i amild contraction
in the spring of 1935,anda notable advance carrying into
the winter of 1935—36.
Somenew factors were present in each of these periods, but
the most notable differences separate the first phase of sharp
expansion from the alternations of contraction and expansion
that follow. These differences lie, partly, in the extent of the
movements. The first recovery far exceeded in magnitude
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movementsare characterized by important differences in
operating conditions, in the field of manufacturing. The
first of the codes introduced under the National Industrial
Recovery Act was approved on July 9,1933;theblanket
code authorized under the President's Re-employment Agree-
ment had been accepted by 700,000employersby August 1st.
The operating conditions prevailing in manufacturing in-
dustries underwent a major change with the inauguration
of the codes. In this fundamental respect, then, the circum-
stances attending the first phase of recovery, up to the sum-
mer of 1933,areclearly distinct from those prevailing up to
May 1935.Itis true that the prospect of operation under
the codes helped to stimulate the early advance and affected
its character. But the detailed regulations later prescribed
under the industrial codes did not, of course, affect operating
conditions during this first surge of recovery.
We must recognize that many factors, other than the codes,
distinguish the first phase of recovery from the period that
followed. The stimulus of monetary change was a potent
force in the first surge of renewed activity. Hopes and fears
centering in the prospects of inflation were stronger during
the first few months than later. Production for stock was
probably more important during the first phase, and such
production would leave its impress upon the movements of
the later period. The potentialities of rapid advance in pro-
ductivity and sharp reduction of operating costs were greater
at the very low level of activity prevailing in February 1933
thanafter the bloom of the first revival had passed. The
factors affecting operating conditions over a short period
differ in various ways from those dominant over a longer
interval. It would be improper to attribute to the influence
of the industrial codes all the differences we shaH note be-
tween the operating conditions prevailing in manufacturing
industries prior to and following the adoption of these codes.312 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
Yet these differences are part of the data required for an ap-
praisal of the codes and of the shifting currents of economic
change from 1933to1936.
For these reasons, then, we break the period of re-
covery here reviewed into three phases—that covering the
sharp rise from February—March 1933toJune—July 1933,
theperiod from the summer of toApril—May and
the phase from April—May '935 to February—March 1936.
Operation under the codes ceased, of course, following the
Supreme Court decision of May 27, 1935.Sincethe turning
points that mark off these periods of recovery are not clearly
to be located in one particular month, and since they do not
coincide, in time, for all the series to be followed, the limits
of the several periods are set with reference to averages of
measurements covering two months.
THE DATA, AND SOME LIMITING CONDITIONS
The basic series from which a].l other measurements are
derived, in tracing the changes of recovery, are given
Table 39, in relative form. These series are based upon
records of production, employment, pay rolls, hours and sell-
ing prices relating to the operations of the major manufac-
turing industries of the United States.
The general changes during the recovery phases distin-
guished in Table 39 are familiar. The first spurt of recovery
carried all series upward, the advance of 45 per cent in pro-
duction being outstanding. The changes of the twenty-two
months following (the period of general operation under the
codes) brought a slight rise in production, further notable
advances in prices, pay rolls and number employed, and a
pronounced decline in average hours worked per week. The
first ten months of the post-NRA operation, in 1935—36, wit-
nessed a rise in output and increases in number of wageMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 313
TABLE 39
A RECORD OF THE FORTUNES OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1933-1936
BASIC MEASUREMENTS 1
February—June—April—February—
March July May March
1933 1933 £935 1936
Physicalvolume of production 100 145 148 158
Number of wage earners employedioo 115 136 140
Total wage disbursements (pay rolls)ioo 127 i8o 192
Average number of working hours
per week, per person ioo 114 97 102
Averageselling price of products ioo 109 125 125
iDescriptionsof the series given in this table will be found in Appendix
VIII-A. The reader should note that the production index of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, on which the present measurements
of production changes rest, shows an advance ofper cent from February-
March to June—July 1933.Butthe compiling authorities call attention to
the fact that this advance was somewhat distorted by the sharp rise in the
output of semi-finished goods in that period. The rise in general manufac-
turing production wassmaller.The figure of 45 per cent used in the present
analysis is a corrected measurement. The basis of correction is explained in
Appendix VIII-A.
Because of this correction, the measurements given in this chapter differ
somewhat from those given in Bulletin 56 of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, in which the results of this analysis were first published.
The monthly indexes of average selling prices of manufactured products
are compared with index numbers based on the records of the Census of
Manufactures in Appendix VIII-B.
earners employed, in wage disbursements and in average
working hours. No change occurred in the average selling
price of manufactured products.
But a more detailed comparison of these movements is re-
quired to bring Out the distinctive features of the period that
opened with the spring revival of In making such com-
parisons and in deriving the requisite measurements we must
recognize the limitations of the data. There are some dif.314 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ferences in the degrees of coverage of the series listed above.
Pay roll and employment statistics Ire drawn from 90 manu-
lacturing industries. Records of average hours worked per
week are secured from a smaller number of establishments,
representing a somewhat smaller number of manufacturing
industries—87 in December 1935. (Only those industries are
included for which information concerning hours of labor
covers at least 20 per cent of all employees.) Price and pro-
duction records relate to still other samples of manufac-
turing operations at large—broad samples, but not the same,
in detail, as those from which the first figures come. Com-
parison of these records and the derivation of measurements
from such comparisons must proceed on the assumption that
each of the basic series is representative of manufacturing
industries in general. Since this is made in the
pages that follow, the various derived figures should be looked
upon as indexes of general tendencies, not as highly accurate
measurements of detailed movemcnts.
In respect of timing, certain other difficulties face us in
making comparisons. The basic productionstatistics are
monthly averages or aggregates, while the records of employ-
ment, pay rolls and hours for each month are derived from
data relating to the week ending at. the date nearest the mid-
dle of the month. The original price quotations vary in this
respect, some being averages of daily figures, some averages
of weekly quotations, some quot2Ltions as of specific dates.
Each set of figures may be taken, however, to be generally
representative of conditions prevailing in given months.
Greater difficulties are introduced by the fact that the final
emergence of finished manufactured products lags behind
the expenditure of labor and of money in the preliminary
productive processes. This lag is not a serious barrier to ac-
curate comparison of statistics of final production and sta-
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flowof materials be reasonably steady. When the process is
extended, however, and when variations in the rate of flow
are considerable, the accuracy of comparisons of concurrent
statistics is lessened. Records of employment and pay rolls
relating to a period of reduced activity may be set against a
flow of finished products resulting from a preceding period
of excessive activity. Conversely, technical conditions of pro-
duction may force the maintenance of a considerable labor
force even though the production of finished products has
been sharply reduced. The automobile industry, with its
periods of preparation for the output of new models, and
the steel industry furnish examples of production and labor
statistics not always strictly comparable on a current monthly
basis. If the lags were constant account could be taken of
them, but in some industries they vary appreciably from time
to time.
The seasonal factor also complicates the task of compari-
son. Some of the basic series compared are subject to sea-
sonal fluctuations, others are not. However, there are real
doubts whether the customary seasonal movements have pre-
vailed, in all cases, under the abnormal conditions of severe
depression. In some instances it is certain that they have not.
Moreover, the magnitude of the usual seasonal movements
is much smaller than the changes here recorded. For these
reasons it has seemed desirable to attempt no correction for
assumed seasonal variations. The actual records of manu-
facturing operations have been utilized.
Various technical difficulties of the types mentioned are
faced in the comparative study of month-to-month fluctua-
tions. Those general movements that persist over longer
periods will not be obscured, however, by the erratic changes
arising from varying temporal relations of production, em-
ployment and prices. In the comparisons actually made in
the following pages the difficulty introduced by erratic month-316 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
to-month movements is met, in part, through the comparison
of averages for several months, rather than indexes for single
months. Even so, not too much weight should be attached to
extreme movements for limited periods, in records relating
to single industries. When the records for different industries
support one another, however, and when movements persist
over time, it is justifiable to conclude that we are dealing with
significant changes, and not with erratic fluctuations result-
ing from shifting leads and lags among the series compared.
With these considerations and limitations in mind, we may
draw such information as we can from the basic measure-
merits in Table 39. The index numbers presented in Table 40,
TABLE 40
A RECORD OF THE FORTUNES OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1933-1936
DERIVED MEASUREMENTS 1
Februar.'—June—April—February—
March July May March
1933 1933 1935 1936
Grossincome ioo 158 185 198
Totalemp:Ioyment (man hours) iOo 131 132 143
Averageoutput per wage earner ioo 126 109 113
Averageoutput per man hour ioo 111 112 110
Averageearnings per wage earner 100 110 132 137
Averagehourly wages 100 97 136 134
Averagelaborcost per unit of
product 100 88 122 122
1 Explanations of the methods employed in deriving these index numbers
will be found in the notes in Appendix VEIl-A.
which have been derived from those in Table 39, define im-
portant aspects of the changes occurring in this period of
revival. The five basic series and the seven sets of derived
measurements constitute the materials of the following
analysis. Using these, we may follow the course of recoveryMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 317
and note certain changes in the operating conditions of manu-
facturing industries and in the relations of these industries
to other elements of the national economy.'2
12Inthis survey we shall use the measurements given in Tables 39 and 40,
whichare taken to be representative of the movements in manufacturing
industries at large in the United States. Attention has been drawn to the
lack of.perfect comparability among some of the series employed. However,
the general conclusions drawn from these comparisons are supported by
evidence relating to smaller samples of major manufacturing industries [or
which more truly comparable measurements of production, employment and
pay rolls are available. These industries include those producing iron and
steel, automobiles, cigars and cigarettes, cement, leather, boots and shoes,
rubber tires and inner tubes, lumber, woolen and worsted goods, cotton
goods, carpets and rugs, and flour, and the meat packing, sugar refining
and petroleum refining industries. Measurements for this substantial group
of 15 manufacturing industries are given below, together with measurements
for all manufacturing industries. In addition, figures are given for 13indus-
tries—the 15inthe above list,less automobiles and cotton textiles. The
cotton textile industry was marked by distinctive changes during the recovery
of 1933—36, and some special difficulties are faced in the automobile industry
in respect of the comparability, in time, of the production records and
employment and pay roll statistics.
February—June— April—February—
March July May March
1933 1933 1935 1936
Grossincome
All manufacturing industries ioo 185 igS
15 industries ioo 195 248 252
13 industries ioo 190 210 229
Totalemployment (man hours)
Allmanufacturing industries 100 131 132 143
15 industries ioo 150 143 150
industries ioo 150 135 148
Averageoutput per wage earner
All manufacturing industries ioo 126 109 113
15 industries ioo 139 126 128
industries ioo 136 ito uS
Average output per man hour
All manufacturing industries ioo 110 112 111
15 industries ioo 114 127 123
13industries ioo 109 109 io8
(Footnote1.2concludedon p. 318)318 PRICESINRECESSIONAND RECOVERY
THERECOVERY OF 1933—1936
In following changes in theoperations ofmanufacturing
industriessince the early months of 1933 various combina-
tions of the measurements presented in Tables 39 and 40
may be used. Each combination will contain a single series
of major importance and two of its component elements. In
each instance the movements of the three related series should
be compared. The measurements entering into the various
combinations are brought together in Table 41. The subse-
quent discussion should be followed with reference to the
detailed entries in this table.
(Footnote 12 concluded)
February--June—April—February—
March July May March
1933 1933 1935 1936
Averageearnings per wage earner
All manufacturing industries 100 110 132 137
15 industries ioo 121 151 156
13 industries too, 122 145 154
Average hourly wages
All manufacturing industries too 136 134
industries 100 99 152 149
industries too 144 142
Average labor cost per unit of product
All manufacturing industries ioo 88 122 122
industries too 87 120 122
industries too go 132 131
The smaller samples, which are rather weighted by basic indus-
tries, show more violent fluctuations in gross income and total employment
than are found in manufacturing industries at large, but the various de-
rived measurements show movements of same general character.(It
should be noted that the figures for the smaller groups and for all manu-
facturing industries for June—July 1933 are not independent, in respect of
output per man hour and labor cost per unit of product. These two series
for the smaller groups have been used in revising production figures for all
industries for this period, correcting for thbias noted on an earlier page.
See also Appendix VIII.A.) This set of melsurements, more carefully con-
trolled than are the figures for all industr:es, serves to check the general
conclusions suggested in the text.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 319
TABLE 41
MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS,
A COMPARISON OF MOVEMENTS DURING DIFFERENT PlIASES OF RECOVERY
PERCENTAGE CHANGEFROM
Feb.—March June—July April—May Feb.—March
1933to 1933to 1935to 1933to
june—July April—May Feb .—March Feb .—March
1933 1935 1936 1936
Gross income and its elements
i.Grossincome +58 +17 +6 +98
2. Production(physical
volume) +45 +2 +7 +58
Sellingprice of products
(average) ±9 ±15 —1 ±25
Employmentand its elements
4. Total employment
(man hours) +3' +1 +7 +43
Wageearners employed +15 +i8 +2 +4°
6. Working hours per per-
son (average weekly) +14 —15 +5 +2
Production and its elements
2. Production +45 +2 +7 +58
5. Wage earners employed +15 +i8 +2 +4°
7. Output per wage earner
(average) +26 —14 +5 +13
4.Total employment
(man hours) +1 +7 +43
8. Output per man hour
(average) +10 +1 0 +11
Wage disbursements and elements
g. Wage disbursements +27 +42 +7 +92
5. Wage earners employed +15 +i8 ±2 +4°
io. Earnings per wage
earner (average) +10 +20 +5 +37
4. Total employment
(man hours) +3' +1 +7 +43
ii.Hourlywages (average) —3 +4° 0 +34
2. Production +45 +2 +7 +58
12. Labor cost per unit
(average) —12 +39 0 +22PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
MANUFACTURING GROSS INCOME AND COMPONENT ELEMENTS
Changes in the gross income of manufacturing industries
may result from changes in the number of units produced,
or in the average selling price per unit. The first three sets
of measurements in Table 41 define these movements
the recovery of In tracing these movements effec-
tive comparisons may be made between the changes in the
sharp revival of the first four months, during the next twenty-
two months of general operation under the codes, and iü the
final period of ten months, following the termination of
NRA.
The net gains of the entire period were substantial, 98
per cent in gross income, resulting from advances of 58 per
cent in volume of production andper cent in average
price per unit. But the gains were not divided equally among
the three phases of recovery. In the short pre-code period all
the series advanced, with rising output as the major factor
in the notable pick-up in gross income. During the era of
code installation and operation under the codes output ad-
vanced only slightly; rising prices were the chief element in
a 17 per cent increase in gross income. This increase con-
tinued in the post-code period, in 1g35—36, with rising pro-
duction as the active factor in the advance. Prices declined
slightly.
Of course, many forces operated all three periods.
Anticipation of the codes played a part in the first advance.
A natural reaction from the tremendous activity of the first
advance, activity leading to production of goods in excess of
current needs, is reflected in the record of the second phase.
We shall have a better basis for judgment concerning the
13Inall threefold comparisons of this sort the figure relating to one series
is the product of the corresponding figures for the two other series, in the
sense that I.581.45X1.09.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 321
part played by code enforcement in the changes of these
periods when we have pressed our inquiry further, for the
changes defined by certain of the other series are more closely
connected with code provisions. The factors affecting total
employment are in this category.
TOTAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT AND COMPONENT
ELEMENTS
Total employment is properly measured in terms of man
hours. Changes in the number of persons employed and in
the average hours of work affect this total. Items (4), and
(6) of Table 41 summarize the record of recovery in these
elements. The notable increase of 31 per cent in total em-
ployment in the pre-code period resulted from almost equal
advances in the number employed and in the average num-
ber of hours worked per wage earner. Between mid-summer
1933 and April—May thevolume of employment showed
no large net change. There was a considerable decline in
average hours .worked, which was offset by an increase in
the number employed. These changes, of course, are mani-
festations of definite elements of the recovery program.
There was spreading of work under the codes. In April—
May 1935 a volume of employment about i per cent greater
than that prevailing when the codes went into effect was
shared among a body of workers some i8 per cent larger.
In the ten months following the termination of the codes
manufacturing employment rose 7percent, both number
of workers and average hours worked increasing. The period
of recovery as a whole shows substantial increases in total
employment and in number of persons employed, with a rise
of 2 per cent in the average number of hours worked, per
person.322 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
PHYSICAL VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION
AND COMPONENT ELEMENTS
Changes in the volume of manufacturing
be viewed as the resultants (though not
causal sense) of changes in the number
output per worker. Items(2), and
relate to these series.
The sharp advance in volume of
pre-code period was achieved thro
number of workers and a still more
output per person employed. (Thetter
attributable, of course, to an increase in hours of work.)
These were changes of the sort usual in revival, though of
exceptional magnitude. A gain ofper cent in volume of
output, from the very low level of early 1933, carried with
it, almost inevitably, a notable advance in output per per-
son, per machine in use, and per marl hour. (We would mis-
read the figures if we shou'd take this gain to be the result of
a great technical revolution. No such revolution occurred
during this brief period of four or five months. The potential
advantages of earlier improvements, technical and otherwise,
could be realized when this sharp gain in volume of output
occurred.) During the twenty-two months of general opera-
tion under the codes the number employed continued to
increase. Output per person declined, however, and aggregate
production increased only 2 per cent. The post-NRA phase
was marked by an increase of 7 per cent in total output, a
slight increase in the number of and a renewed ad-
vance in output per worker.
Changes in the average length of the working week affect
the preceding measurements of output per person. In Table
41changesin total output are shown, in relation to changes




(7) of Table 41
production during the
ugh an increase in the
pronounced increase in
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(8)]. Indexes of output per man hour are a measure of true
productivity,14 far more accurate, of course, than is a measure
of output per person under conditions marked by changing
hours of work.
The advance of io per cent in output per man hour in the
first early spurt was in some degree a cause, in greater degree
a result, of the notable increase in total output. Increased
market demand made possible an increase in productivity,
an increase in its turn facilitated by earlier improvements in
equipment, in technique and in the quality of labor. In the
twenty-two months that followed this pronounced gain in
productivity, output per man hour increased approximately
1 per cent.15 No further change in average output per man
hour occurred during the ten months following the termina-
tion of NRA. The figures defining net change, over the en-
tire period of recovery, show a rise of 58 per cent in volume
of production, an advance of ii per cent in output per man
hour.
14Itis convenient to measure industrial productivity on a man hour basis.
This is not to be taken to mean that changes in productivity are due ex-
clusively, or even primarily, to the human factor in production. Mechanical
equipment may be a more important factor in changing productivity than
human skill or intensity of application.
15This,of course, is an average figure, behind which there lie large and
small productivity losses in certain industries, gains in others. Indeed, the
fact should be emphasized that any such analysis as this, which necessarily
runs in terms of averages, must ignore the fortunes of. individual industries.
At times of extreme change there are bound to be wide diversities of for-
tune. An account that included many industrial case histories would reveal
the details of the changes affecting the industrial structure in this recession.
But we content ourselves here with the general tendencies that dominated
the period, recalling only that many plants and industries followed distinc-
tive courses of their own.324 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TOTAL WAGE DISBURSEMENTS OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES,
AND ELEMENTS OF THE TOTAL
We turn to a survey of wage disbursements during the re-
covery, viewing these, first, from the point of view of wage
recipients. Changes in the aggregate and in two of its ele-
ments during the several phases of recovery are defined by
items (g), and(io) of Table 41.
Total wage disbursements expanded during all three pe-
riods, the relative advance in the second period being ma-
terially greater than the gains of the pre-NRA and post-NRA
phases. Increases in the number of wage earners and• in
average earnings per wage earner contributed, during all
phases of recovery, to the expansion of the aggregate wage
bill.
More light is thrown on the changes in wages and earnings
during these periods by a somewhat different division of ele-
ments. Total wage disbursements may be considered as the
product of the number of hours worked and the average
wage per hour. Analysis into these elements, which appear
as items and(ii) in Table 4', makes it possible to follow
changes in wage rates, and to determine their relation to
fluctuations in total wage disbursements.
We find quite diverse changes duringthe three periods
compared. The pre-code advance of 27 per cent in the ag-
gregate earnings of manufacturing labor was accompanied
by a sharp rise in total man hours workedi per cent), and
by a drop of 3 per cent in the average hourly wage. In the
second period, characterized by operation under new wage
provisions, with only a minor change in volume of produc-
tion, we find a slight increase in total man hours worked, an
advance of 40 per cent in average hourly wages. Here was a
new factor at work in a period of revival, with definite wage
regulations increasing hourly rates at a much earlier stageMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 325
thanwas to be expected from the usual processes of revival.
The net effect was to increase total wage disbursements 42
percent between June—July 1933andApril—May '935, al-
though production advanced but 2percent and employment
1percent. During the ten months that followed the end of
code operations employment rose 7percent, and average
hourly earnings remained constant. Over the entire period
of recovery we have a pronounced advance in total wages
paid, a considerable rise in man hours worked and a notable
increase in hourly rates of pay.
It is desirable to trace some of the economic accompani-
inents of these widely different means of achieving the same
result, i.e., a given gain in the aggregate wages disbursed to
manufacturing labor. Certain of these consequences may be
followed by comparing changes in wage disbursements [item
ofTable 41],withchanges in total volume of production
[item (2)],andin labor cost per unit of product [item (12)].
Theincrease of 27percent in the total wage bill of manu-
facturing industries during the period of pre-code expansion
may be viewed as the net resultant of a gain of 45 per cent
in number of units produced and a decline of 12percent in
average labor cost per unit. Thus, although the average
hourly wage dropped oniy 3 per cent, and average earnings
per wage earner increased io per cent, the labor cost per
unit fell 12percent. This resulted, of course, from a gain of
io per cent in output per man hour. Such reduction of an
important element of production costs worked definitely
towards the correction of the great disparity between the
prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods existing
at the low point of the depression.
The advance of 42percent in total wage disbursements
during the code period resulted from two quite different
types of change in the component elements. The number
of units produced increased onlyper cent, while average326 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
labor costs, per unit of product, roseper cent. Increasing
production and falling labor costs accompanied the first rapid
gain in the total rewards of manufacturing labor. A prac-
tically constant volume of production and sharply rising
labor costs accompanied the advance in aggregate payments
to labor that occurred in the period of operation under the
codes.'6 Wage disbursements in the post-NRA period con-
tinued to advance. It is significant that no change in labor
costs per unit occurred during this period. For the recovery
as a whole, to February—March 1936, increases of 22 per Cent
in labor costs per unit and 58 per cent in number of units
produced contributed to an advance of 92 per cent in total
wages paid.
In interpreting these figures and in comparing the pre-code
and code periods we must allow, again, for the influence of
factors not connected with code administration. A sharp drop
in labor costs per unit of product was to be expected, during
the first spurt of revival, as an accompaniment of the pick-up
from the very low level of activity prevailing in February
1933. The situation in mid-summe:c 1933 offered no such
potentialities of sudden reduction in operating costs, even
though all working conditions had remained unchanged. On
the other hand, had working conditions remained un-
changed, the first reduction ofi 2 per cent in labor costs
would not have been followed by an advance of 39 per cent.'7
16 This measurement of advance in labor costs is subject to at least two types
of bias. Itis probable that the larger establishments in the sample from
which data on pay rolls are secured conform:d more closely, on the whole,
to code regulations than did the smaller establishments. This would tend to
make the measurement of labor costs somewhat higher than it would be
with complete coverage. On the other hand, itis known that there isa
negative bias in the reported pay roll statistics, arising from the use of a
constant sample. Such bias would tend to lower the measure of labor costs.
These errors, if present, tend to offset one another.
17 The apparent advance ofper cent in average labor cost per unit of
product in American manufacturing industrie:; between June—July 1933 andMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 327
SUMMARY OF THE CHANGES OF RECOVERY IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES
The three years from February—March 1933 to February—
March 1936weremarked by a curious combination of move-
ments in the operations of manufacturing industries. Physical
output and gross income increased during each of the periods
we have distinguished; the sharpest spurts came in the pre-
code period. The great gain in productivity came also in the
pre-NRA period. Thereafter output per man hour advanced
slightly, output per worker declined. Total employment
(man hours) advanced notably in the first period, remained
almost constant under the codes. On the other hand, the
greatest advances in number of wage earners employed, wage
disbursements and average earnings per employed worker
came during the period of code operation. Average hourly
wages and labor costs per unit of product declined in the
pre-code period, rose by approximately 40 per cent under
the codes. Average selling prices of manufactured goods rose
prior to and during the stage of code operation, declined
slightly after the termination of the codes.
It is clear that certain tendencies of the first period were
checked or reversed during operation under the codes. Phys-
ical output increased by a bare 2 per cent in twenty-two
months of NRA. Evidence of internal difficulties, during this
period, in the form of retarded productivity and advancing
April—May 1935reflects,in part, the abnormal conditions prevailing in mid-
summer 1933,afterthe first spurt of revival. This figure is useful for com-
parative purposes, but is not to be taken as an accurate measure of changing
industrial efficiency. More significance attaches to the measure defining the
change in average labor cost per unit over the period from February—March
1933toFebruary—March 1936. This net advance of 22percent, over a period
that includes the material reduction of labor costs during thefirst four
months, representsanotable departure from the typical movement of
recovery.328 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
labor costs, adds to the darkness of the picture. And yet,
throughout the period of recovery, gross income advanced,
wage disbursements continued to increase, earnings per em-
ployed worker rose, and the number of workers on pay rolls
continued to increase. Purchasing power was being disbursed
in ever-expanding volume, despite the apparently adverse
conditions indicated for the second period by the various
records of physical production, productivity, and labor costs.
Here were strangely conflicting movements. But we shall
have a better perspective on these shifts when we compare
them with changes during the preceding recession and dur-
ing earlier periods of business revival.
RECOVERY MOVEMENTS IN RELATION TO A PRE-RECESSION
STANDARD
Any economic recovery is closely related to the preceding
period of recession. That recessior. must condition the re-
covery at many points and vitally affect its character. The
exceptional gravity and extent of the recession in American
business between 1929 and early 1q33 cannot be ignored in
surveying the changes brought by recovery. For this reason
we supplement the survey of changes during the phase of re-
covery by a summary account of these changes viewed against
a pre-recession base. Measurements are given in Table 42.
(Certain of the series given in Table 41 do not appear in
Table 42. Where measurements for the longer period could
not be considered accurate, in detail, it appeared desirable
to restrict statements to general terms and not to cite spe-
cific figures.)
Shifting the standard of referenc:e to a pre-recession base
has one immediate effect, to reduce the apparent magnitude
of the shifts of recovery. For the recession carried most eco-
nomic series to such low levels in the winter of 1932—33 thatMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 329
TABLE 42
RECESSION AND RECOVERY IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, 1929—1936
June—February— June—April— February—
July MarchJuly May March
1929 1933 1933 1935 .193 6
(currentdollars)
Gross income and its elements
i. Gross income 53 62 66
2.Production(physical
volume) 100 49 71 72 77
Sellingprice of
products (average) 100 69 75 86 86
Production and its elements
2.Production ioo 49 71 72 77
5. Wage earners employed 100 57 77 79
7. Output per wage earner ioo 86 109 97
Wagedisbursements and elements
wagedisbursements ioo 35 45 64 68
5. Wage earners employed ioo 57 65 77 79
io. Earnings per wage earner
(average) 100 6t 6g 83 86
11.Averagehourly wage ioo 78 76 103 104
2. Production ioo 49 71 72 77
12.Laborcost per unit of
product (average) ioo 71 63 8g 88
(dollars of constant purchasing power)
Gross income and its elements
i. Gross income 1 100 54 75 8o
2.Production(physical
volume) , 100 49 71 72
.77
Sellingprice of
products(average)1 100 111 io6 104 104
Wage disbursements and elements
Wage disbursements 2 100 49 61 77 So
5. Wage earners employed ioo 57 65 77 79
io.Real earnings per wage
earner (average)2 100 86 94 100 101330 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 42 (cont.)
RECESSION AND RECOVERY IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES,
June— June—April— February—
July MarchJuly May March
1929 1933 1935 1936
(dollam of constant purchasing power)
11. Average hourlywage2 100 LoB 103 124 122
gb.Wage disbursements 1 100 56 77
2.Production 100 49 71 72 77
12.Labor cost per unitof
product(average)' 100 L14 89 107 io6
1 The index number of wholesale prices cons:ructed by the National Bureau
of Economic Research was used as a deflator.
2 The index of the cost of living of industrial workers constructed by the
National Industrial Conference Board was u;ed as a deflator.
the succeeding rises, in percentage terms, run into relatively
high figures. On a pre-recession base the percentage changes
are much less pronounced.
In summary, the situation as o:E February—March 1936,
with reference to the situation existing in June—July 1929
was marked by the following featu:ces:
The gross income of manufacturing industries had been
reduced 34 per cent in current dolLirs, 20 per cent in dollars
of constant purchasing power, at wholesale. The physical
volume of manufacturing production was 23 per cent below
the 1929 standard. Per unit prices 'were lower, but the aver-
age per unit purchasing power of manufactured goods in
wholesale markets was higher. Relatively to other goods,
commodities of this type cost more, per unit, than in 1929.
The actual volume of manufacturing employment, mea-
sured in man hours, had been reduced about two-fifths and
the working force had been reduced one-fifth.
Industrial productivity, per wage earner employed, had
declined slightly. Productivity per man hour had risen. TheMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
gain may be estimated at something more than 25 per cent,
scored during the period of recession and in the first spurt
of revival.
The aggregate purchasing power of manufacturing labor
was some 20 per cent lower. The purchasing power of the
earnings of each employed worker stood just about at the
1929level.The purchasing power of an hour's wage (i.e., the
real hourly wage) had increased approximately 22 per cent.
The total wage bill of manufacturing industries, measured
in dollars of constant purchasing power at wholesale, was
approximately i8 per cent lower. Average labor cost per
unit of goods produced had risen approximately 6 per cent
(cost being here measured in terms of the same value
standard).
It is apparent from these figures that the recovery in Amer-
ican manufacturing industries, up to the spring of 1936,
hadfallen short of restoring the pre-recession level of gross
income, of production, of employment, or of aggregate pur-
chasing power of labor. Industrial productivity and real wage
rates on a man hour basis were much higher than before the
recession, nominal wage rates were higher, and real labor
costs per unit of product were somewhat higher.
But we need other criteria, in appraising the shifting
movements of the current recovery. Earlier periods of busi-
ness expansion furnish useful standards of reference.
ECONOMIC CHANGES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES DURING
FIVE PERIODS OF BUSINESS EXPANSION, APPROXIMATELY
EQUAL IN RESPECT OF DEGREE OF RECOVERY
A comparison of manufacturing operations during differ-
ent periods of business expansion may be expected to disclose
some of the distinctive features of the current movement.
It is true that there exists no fixed schedule of recovery, to332 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
which business movements always conform, but something
of the nature of a common pattern, is found in the cyclical
fluctuations of the economic system. Some of character-
istics of this pattern, and distinctive deviations from it, are
revealed by the series of measurements presented in this
section.
Various modes of comparison are possible in any such
survey. For the present purpose it seems desirable to trace
the movements of important econo:rnic series over periods of
expansion marked by approximately equal degrees of in-
crease in the physical output of manufacturing industries.
This magnitude, as averaged for i;he months of December
1934 and January 1935, was 37 per cent greater than at the
low point of February—March 1933.18Itis pertinent to in-
quire how the changes in manufa:turing industries during
this period, with respect to employment, productivity, labor.
costs, etc., compared with corresponding changes during ear-
her periods of equal increase in volumeoutput.'° We
should note that in concentrating attention upon the opera-
tions of manufacturing industries we ignore numerous eco-
nomic factors—such as monetary and credit conditions, rela-
18Advancesof approximately equal magnitude could not be secured for the
three preceding revivals, if the record were carried through 1935.Sincewe
are interested in operating changes accompanying similar advances, we re-
strict the survey of-recent changes to the mcvements up to January 1935.
19 Ifwe compare, with respect to changes in aggregate production, periods
of business recovery widely separated in time, error may be introduced into
our conclusions by the changing character of the elements entering into the
aggregate. Different industries, marked by important differences of cyclical
behavior, may dominate a national econom'y at different times. These domi-
nant industries would place their own impress on the aggregate into which
they enter. But over fifteen years no great changes occurred in the relative
importance of elements entering into aggregate manufacturing production, in
the United States. The incidence of recovery may, of course, be different, at
different times, but this is a condition affecting all comparisons of this sort,
in which aggregates of any kind are used.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 333
tioflS among elements of the price structure, saving and in-
vestment—which condition the course and character of re-
covery. Our interest, however, is not in the economy at large,
or in the full complex of circumstances that shape a business
revival. It is in a particular segment of the total, and in the
internal relations among the elements of this segment. These
relations will not be unaffected by external developments,
but such developments are of secondary importance in the
present comparison.
In this comparison no attempt is made to introduce cor-
rections for seasonal movements. Accurate indexes of sea-
sonal variation are not available for all the series. Moreover,
itis known that in important industries the customary
seasonal pattern has been modified in recent years. For this
reason, and because the cyclical changes here in question
are of much greater magnitude than the seasonal, it seems
advisable to utilize the uncorrected records. Accurate adjust-
ment for seasonal swings would modify the picture in detail
but not in fundamental respects.
We may enhance the value of this survey by utilizing two
different sets of figures for the most recent recovery. The
early spurt of brought an increase in volume of output
well in excess of 37 per cent. The closest possible approach
to that figure is provided by the period from February—
March 1933 to May—June 1933, during which the volume
of manufacturing production increased 39 per cent. The
changes of this phase may be compared with those of the pe-
riod February—March 1933 to December 1934—January 1935,
as well as with those of the recoveries that began in 1921, in
1924, and in 1927. The period of the first rise, in 1933, is
short, and therefore the changes must not be looked upon
as 'resulting from a major technical revolution. They are
significant, however, as regards the actual operating condi-334 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tions of industry, and the relation of currently-expended
effort to current outlay and current returns.
As in the preceding section we shall deal with certain
major series and constituent elenients of each series.The
measurements appear in TableThe basic series are pre-
sented graphically and the dates to which the entries in Table
relate are indicated in Figure 13, in order that the nature
FIGURE
MOVEMENTS OF SELECTED SERIES RELATING TO AMERICAN
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1920-1936
1920 19211922 19231924 1925 1926 1927
Ratioscale
*Asterisksmark the terminal dates
in the text.
1928 1929 1930 19311932 1933 1934 1935 1936
the five periods of recovery analyzedMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 335
of the measurements to be compared may be clear. Data are
picked from their setting for the purpose of the quantitative
comparison, and it is proper that the reader see what this
setting is in each instance.
It is obvious that although the periods of business expan-
sion here compared cover equal degrees of recovery, when
physical output of manufactured goods is the yardstick of
recovery, they do not cover equal proportionate parts of busi-
ness cycles. Phases of revival and expansion vary in amplitude
and duration, as do business cycles themselves. In studying
certain technical aspects of business cycles it is desirable to
isolate identical cyclical segments. But interest attaches, also,
to the comparison of cyclical movements accompanying given
degrees of increase in volume of production.20
The items in Table 43, for different periods of recovery,
may be compared in detail by the reader. Certain general
conclusions based upon the above evidence, and other data,
are given in the final section of this chapter. At this point
we may be content with a brief summary of the main points
revealed by that table.
In respect of the attributes here studied the sharp initial
recovery of 1933 appears to have conformed to the pattern
of earlier revivals, a pattern that is strikingly repeated in the
first four of the five periods covered. But the measurements
20 Reference has been made to the exceptional severity of the recession of
1929—33, and to the fact that the relative changes of recovery are affected
by the severity of the earlier decline. Itis to be expected that recoveries,
following recessions of varying magnitudes, will differ,in some respects.
But we do not know how the pattern of recovery is affected by the preceding
recession. The reader will bear in mind the differing magnitudes of the
recessions preceding the phases of expansion to which the measurements in
Table 43 relate. It will be useful to recall that the volume of manufacturing
production declined approximately 27 per cent prior to the 1921 recovery,
26 per cent prior to the 1924 recovery, andper cent prior to the 1927
recovery, as compared with a drop of about 50 per cent from 1929 to 1933.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,338 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
of net change from early 1933 to early 1935 depart apprecia-
bly from the customary pattern of business revival. The notes
that follow relate to the net movements of the period from
February—March 1933 to December 1934—January 1935.
This period brought a greater increase in gross income than
did equal degrees of recovery, in physical terms, in earlier re-
vivals. A much more rapid rise in per unit selling prices ac-
counted for the greater increase in gross income.
The number employed increased much more rapidly. Average
hours worked per person decreased;earlier recoveries were
marked by increases in average hours worked.
Output per worker advanced only slightly. Substantial in-
creases had marked earlier recoveries;. The recent increase in
volume of production was effected primarily through the employ-
ment of more' workers.
The net gain in output per man hour compares favorably with
earlier advances. (The gain in the recent period was effected, it
has been noted, during the first four months of recovery.)
Total wage disbursements, earnings per wage earner and num-
ber employed increased much more rapidly than in earlier re-
vivals.
Earnings per hour increased much more rapidly than in earlier
periods of revival.
The total wage bill of manufacturing industries and average
labor cost per unit of goods produced increased much more
rapidly than in earlier revivals.
It is desirable that we supplement these comparative mea-
surements with others in which some account is taken of
changes in the standard of value. A rise of 20 per cent in
the average selling prices of goods will have
one meaning when the general level of prices remains con-
stant, a quite different meaning when the general price level
falls 20 per cent. So, also, a given gain in aggregate pay rolls







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
and a different meaning when living costs are rising rapidly.
No single instrument, suitable for correcting all our value
series for changes in the value of money, is available. How-
ever, by using a general index of wholesale prices in deflating
certain series and an index of living costs among industrial
wage earners for other series, we may approximate the mea-
surements we desire (Table 44).
It is apparent from a comparison of Table 44 with Table
43 that certain distinctive features of the recovery of 1933—
35 have been due entirely tothe more rapidriseof
general prices. The apparent advantage of the more recent
recovery in respect of per unit gain in the selling prices
of manufactured goods is removed, when account is taken
of changing monetary values.2' So, also, the gain in the gross
income of manufacturing industries, which was higher for
the recent period than for any of the earlier periods, when
current dollars were the standard of value, becothes the low-
est of the. figures compared when correction is made for
changing monetary values.
Recent advances in wage disbursements and in the rewards
of labor remain substantially above similar gains during
earlier periods of recovery, after lull account is taken of
changing living costs. The total purchasing power of manu-
facturing labor increased 46 per cent between the low point
of early 1933 and the beginning ef 1935. The nearest ap-
proach to this figure came in the 192 1—22 recovery, when
pay rolls, corrected for changes inthe cost of living, ad-
21The6 per cent loss in per unitworthof manufactured goods between
February—March 1933andDecember 1934—January 1935isto be interpreted
with refereilce tO the base from which the change is measured. At the low
point of early 1933 manufactured goods enjoiied a much greater relative ad-
vantage than in any of the three preceding depressions. Reduction of this
advantage was the more imperative, therefore, with reference to the conditions
of general recovery.MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 341
vanced27 per cent. Comparison of the entries for the last
two periods shows that the major part of the recent gain of
46 per cent came after mid-summer, 1933.Referenceto the
measurements relating to average real hourly wages shows
that the novel factor in this gain was a sharp increase in real
hourly rates of pay(i.e., money rates corrected for living
costs). The rise of 19percent in these rates, from 1933to
1935,standsin notable contrast to the narrower movements
of earlier revivals.
If we may measure changes in the purchasing power of
the manufacturer's dollar with reference to changes in the
general level of wholesale prices, and deflate total pay rolls
accordingly, we have the corrected wage disbursement fig-
ures given as item (9b) of Table 44. In dollars of constant
purchasing power at wholesale the wage bill of manufactur-
ing industries shows an advance of 26 per cent over the
period of recovery in 1933—35.Thisis distinctly higher than
the advances during earlier revivals marked by roughly equal
increases in the volume of manufacturing production. The
explanation is found in the measurements of changing labor
costs, per unit of product. In terms of the same constant
dollars, these costs dropped 8 per cent from 1933to1935,as
compared with drops of from 12to23 per cent in earlier
recoVeries.
Perhaps the most significant comparisons to be made,
among the measurements in Tables 43 and 44, are those re-
lating to the changes from February—March 1933toMay—
June 1933andfrom February—March 1933toDecember
1934—January 1935.Theactual degrees of recovery were
nearly the same; the bases from which changes are measured
are identical. It is reasonable to assume that the differences
between the two sets of measurements are due to new factors
introduced into the operations of manufacturing industries342 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
after June 1933.Themost important of these new factors
were those connected with the industrial codes.
SUMMARY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY, MANUFACTURING
MARGINS AND SELLING PRICES
The bottom of the depression found production and em-
ployment in manufacturing industries unprecedentedly low.
The problems of readjustment brought by the general de-
cline of prices during the preceding four years were acute
in these industries. Various factors impeded rapid'adaptation
to a new set of operating conditions. Heavy investment in
capital equipment at a price level much higher than that
prevailing after the recession was one of the most important.
At the low point of the depression overhead costs, labor
costs and selling prices were relatively high in manufactur-
ing industries. The purchasing power of all those drawing
incomes from these industries had been materially reduced.
Material costs, however, were low, and productivity had in-
creased during the four years of recession. If recovery in
volume could be effected, prompt improvement in other
respects could be expected. But this recovery in volume was
in part conditional upon correction of certain of the adverse
price relations that had developed during the recession. In
particular, a substantial advance in raw material prices, rela-
tively to the prices of manufacture ci goods, would provide
a stimulus to the buying power of primary producers and
would help to restore the volume of intergroup trade.
The first part of this survey dealt with the relative changes
of prices among raw materials and manufactured goods dur-
ing recovery. Material reduction ofwide margin separat-
ing the prices of these two groups of commodities took place
during the first five months of recovery. There were some
variations in the degree of change occurring among differentMANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
classes of raw and of processed goods, but with one minor
exception the moves towards pre-recession and pre-War
trading relations were considerable. During the ten months
that followed this correctional movement was checked and,
except among mineral products, was rather sharply reversed.
The summer months of 1934, which were marked by par-
ticularly adverse conditions in farming areas, brought a re-
sumption of the movement towards earlier price relations.
For raw producers' goods as a class a considerable net gain
had been effected by the early summer of 1936,butthe dif-
ferential price advantage of manufactured goods remained
substantial by standards of 1929,andeven greater by 1913
standards.
Materials of another sort were utilized in tracing a variety
of movements affecting the internal operating conditions of
manufacturing industries during the most recent recovery
and earlier phases of revival. It was found that the advance
of the pre-code period, from February—March 1933toJune—
July 1933, definitely followed the pattern of earlier periods.
Primary emphasis was on production as a means of expand-
ing income, profits and the returns of labor. Production
advanced more rapidly than selling prices. Production ad-
vanced more rapidly than the number of persons employed,
and productivity per worker increased. Production advanced
more rapidly than number of man hours worked, and output
per man hour increased. Production advanced more rapidly
than wage disbursements, and labor cost per unit of product
declined. Expanding production was a major factor in ad-
vancing gross income.
With respect to the purchasing power of labor, expanding
production again played a dominant part. Labor costs per
unit of output declined, with rising volume augmenting the
total wage bill. Time rates for labor held practically constant,
during revival; increasing man hours of employment oper-344 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ated as the active factor in the expansion of aggregate re
turns. Total employment (man hours) rose more rapidly
than the number of persons employed; hours of employment
per person increased.
Rapidly increasing production arid more slowly rising
prices contributed to a sharp advance in gross income. This
meant, although present records do not bear on this point,
immediate increases in profits, in tim aggregate.
These were the conditions accompanying a revival of the
traditional type. There is, of course, no reason to accept the
pattern of earlier revivals as a criterion to which recovery
from the depression of 193 1—33 should necessarily have con-
formed. This was a graver depress:ion than those we had
known before; it differed in character as well as in degree
from similar periods of economic stagnation in the past.
Moreover, the periods of activity that were launched by
these earlier revivals were marked by important economic
as well as social defects. There is nothing sacred about the
standard defined by these precedents.. Yet, in default of other
standards, we must get from them information as we
may concerning the operating conditions of this little-under-
stood industrial machine of ours.
The recovery of 1933—36 is differentiated from earlier re-
vivals by a reversal of the traditional pattern that may be
dated, it appears, from the general adoption of industrial
codes that began in mid-summer, 1q33. Of course, it is not
fair to conclude that the codes alon.e accounted for all the
reversals we have noted. Many circumstances affected the
economic changes of these disturbed months. But it is a just
assumption that the new industrial environment created by
the codes had an immediate effect upon the internal opera-
ting conditions defined by the various ratios presented in
earlier sections. This assumptionisstrengthened by the
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period were again manifest in industrial operations after the
termination of the codes.
The outstanding feature of the period of operation under
the codes lies in the apparent reduction of emphasis on pro-
duction and industrial productivity as a means of swelling
gross income and increasing the aggregate return of labor.
Rising prices, with a practically constant volume of produc—
tion marked this period. The productivity of manufacturing
industries (as measured in output per man hour) showed a
net gain of i per cent after twenty-two months of operation
under the codes, as contrasted with an advance of io per
cent during the preceding four months. Too much weight
should not be placed upon this development, for the factors
involved are complex, and the reasons for changes in pro-
ductivity are seldom clear. The sharp increase in productivity
per man hour during the pre-NRA spurt probably repre-
sented almost a full realization of the potential advantages
existing at the low point of the depression. A subsequent
check does not provide definite evidence of technical or
organizational weakness, or of human inefficiency. It is fair
to conclude, however, that the new conditions existing after
mid-summer i933 did not provide a stimulus to enhanced
industrial efficiency.
An increase in the aggregate purchasing power of labor
was one of the objectives of the recovery program, and such
an increase was very definitely won. Over some twenty-two
months, while the physical volume of manufacturing produc-
tion was increasing 37 per cent, aggregate wage disburse-
ments by manufacturing industries increased 65 per cent.22
22 These figures relate to changes between February—March 1933 and December
1934—January 1935. The percentages of increase in production and wage
disbursements become 58 and 92, respectively, if the records are carried to
February—March 1936. Since the present figures are given for comparison
with movements in earlier revivals, the shorter period is covered.346 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECO VERY.
Equal production increases during :he three preceding re-
vivals had brought advances of from 14 to 24 per cent in
total wage disbursements. What is here notable is not the
degree of increase, however. The fact that wage payments
had dropped to excessively low levels in the winter of 1932—
33 would lead one to expect a sharper relative advance, with
recovery. The distinctive features of the recent rise are found
in the relations of wage disbursements to other movements
of the recovery period. Labor costs per unit of output in-
creased materially; labor costs per unit of time expended
rose sharply. In these respects the ]atest advance departed
most significantly from the traditional pattern of revival.
Adjustment of these various measurements to take account
of changes in the level of prices and in living costs alters
the general picture somewhat. The rise in selling prices of
manufactured goods in the recent recovery disappears when
such adjustment is made. The increase in the aggregate
purchasing power of manufacturing labor is less pronounced
than the increase in wages in terms of current dollars (the
actual increase in purchasing power amounted to 46 per cent,
however, to the beginning of 1935).Similarly,the perspec-
tive is changed and the apparent magnitude of some of the
recent changes reduced when the cF.anges occurring during
the recovery of 1933—36 are measured against 1929values,
instead of 1933 values. But the char;icteristic features of the
recovery of 1933—36 are clearly discernible, no matter what
the standard of reference may be.apparent check to the
advance in industrial productivity after mid-summer 1933,
maintenanceof a short working week and an exceptionally
heavy use of men to maintain a given volume of physical
output, a relatively sharp advance in the aggregate purchas-
ing power of labor and notable advances in labor costs per
unit of time and per unit of product are distinctive of the
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High labor costs were, of course, a necessary accompani-
ment of a rapid increase in the time rate of wage payment
(unaccompanied by an equal gain in productivity) and of a
rise in total wage disbursements far exceeding the increase
in physical volume of production. The price of an expansion
in purchasing power, so achieved, was the exceptional rise
in costs we have noted.
Why did this notable rise in hourly wage rates, in aggre-
gate wage payments, and in labor costs per unit of product
not lead to a much sharper rise in the selling prices of manu-
factured goods than that actually recorded? The prices of
manufactured goods rose somewhat less rapidly than the
general price level between July andMay 1935. (The
price level of all commodities at wholesale rose 15perCent,
that of manufactured goods 12 per cent.) This fact is ap-
parently inconsistent with the advancing costs we have
noted.23 The answer, I think, is that the price advantage
23 If we take account of the relative movements of the prices of raw and
processed goods over the entire period from February to the spring of
1936 definite reductions of the disparities developing during the recession are
to be observed. Yet we misread the changes of this period if we fail to note
the actual course and timing of these readjustments.
Correction of the disparities existing in February 1933 called for a rise in
raw material prices, relatively to the prices of manufactured goods. Between
February—March 1933 and June_July 1933 raw materials rose 22 per cent in
price, manufactured goods 9 per cent. This was the pre-code period. During
the ten succeeding months, from June—July to April_May 1934k, the
prices of raw materials rose 8 per cent, the prices of manufactured goods
io per cent. The earlier ameliorative movements were definitely reversed,
during this period of operation under the codes. A new correctional move-
ment took place during the summer of 1934, a movement clearly attributable
to the influence'of the drought on the prices of farm products. From April_
May to August_September 1934 the prices of raw materials rose io per cent,
the prices of manufactured goods 2 per cent. Thereafter, through the spring
of 1936, there was no appreciable change in the relations between the prices
of these two groups of commodities.
There was, thus, definite improvement in the relative position of raw
materials during the period prior to code enforcement, and during the sum-348 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
already enjoyed by manufactured goods as a result of less
severe liquidation during the recession, provided a margin
out of which these rising costs could be met withoutgreat
additional price rise. The prices of manufactured goods were
already high, relatively, and this price advantage, which
tended to be nominal rather than real when volume of sales
was low, became substantial with an increasing volume of
business. The new costs, then, served not so much to advance
the selling prices of manufactured goods as to impede a
downward adjustment of the real prices of manufactured
goods, an adjustment imperatively if the founda-
tions of a lasting recovery were to be Laid.* During the forty-
three months of recession from July 1929 to February 1933
the prices of raw materials fell 49 per cent; the prices of
flier drought in 1934. When the movements of these two periods are removed,
we find price changes working against the &wnward readjustment of the
real per unit value of manufactured goods.
*DIRECTOR'SCOMMENT: Other and equally important causes of the failure of
these real prices to fall were: the power to sustain prices and restrict output
exerted by industry through NRA codes and non-legal monopolistic devices;
the relatively large proportion of overhead in manufacturing costs in heavily
mechanized industries; the accounting habits which tend to recover all exist-
ing overhead even on small volume, thus increasing unit overhead costs; the
resistance that large industries are able to offer to capital reorganization or
bankruptcy. It cannot be assumed that lower prices would not have been
compatible with the existing wage rates if less efficient competitors had been
eliminated, if prices had been forced down by competition or regula-
tion, and larger volume of production had resulted—George Soule
DIRECTOR'S NOTE: I feel compelled to note my d:.sagreement with much of the
above comment and with its implications. I do not wish to carry the dis-
cussion too far away from Professor Mills' and therefore observe only:
(i) That in practice, according to my observation—and I should suppose
in theory_price reductions are more readily conceded in times of small
demand where a large part of costsis indirect and must be met whether
or not sales are made than where the cost is more largely a direct cost that
need not be incurred unless it is worthwhile tc do so; and (2) That I think
the comment overrates the effects of the assumed accounting habit.—George
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manufactured goods fellper cent. The gain in the real
value, that is, in the average per unit purchasing power, of
manufactured goods during this period was i i per cent. In
default of a permanent shift in intergroup relations, correc-
tion of this condition was essential to the restoration of
trade in anything approaching normal volume. Some degree
of correction was effected during the period of recovery we
have reviewed, but a disparity still existed in 1936. It was
th.is differential advantage existing at the low point of reces-
SjOfl,24 an advantage that became substantial with an expand-
ing volume of production, that made possible the payment
of higher labor costs and even made it possible for profits
to expand, without an exceptional rise in the selling prices
of manufactured goods. But the persistence of the margin
that made it possible to meet higher labor costs and to make
profits, even though volume of output remained low by
normal standards, retarded full expansion of sales and of
output and the restoration of employment in customary
volume. And in so doing it worked to prevent the restoration
of a normal volume of wage disbursements.
In following the notable increases in wage disbursements
and in labor costs during the recovery of 1933—36weshould
not overlook the severity of the preceding declines. If labor
costs be measured in the dollars the manufacturer receives
for his products (i.e., if labor costs be deflated by an index
of the selling prices, at wholesale, of manufactured goods)
we find that in February—March 1936 these costs stood only
some 6 per cent above the level of June—July 1929. In the
same units, the average selling price of manufactured goods
was 4 per cent higher. If labor costs in manufacturing in-
dustries were high in 1936, they were high to the extent that
24 The potential advantage resulting from price relations was rendered much
greater by a considerable increase in output per man hour during the
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the prices of manufactured goods as a class were high. With
respect to the relation of labor cost to the selling prices of
manufactured goods, the sharp advance of the period of
recovery had done little more than correct for the severe
recession that preceded. For labor costs per unit of product
had fallen 29 per cent, from June—July 1929 to February—
March '933; the selling prices of manufactured goods had
fallen 31 per cent. This means that, with only a minor dif-
ference, the aggregate wage bill showed a net decline equal
to that occurring in the gross of manufacturing in-
dustries. Wage liquidation paralleled the general drop in
gross income, during these four years of recession. In this
respect, the recession of 1929—33 stands alone, among recent
cyclical declines. For, traditionally, the decline in wage
disbursements lags behind the drop in the gross income of
manufacturing industries, and labor finds itself, at the bot-
tom of the depression, getting a larger share of the aggregate
receipts. This was not true of the situation.25
Of course, the difference between time rates of pay and
labor costs per unit of product is to 1e distinguished, in this
analysis. If time rates of pay remain constant when industrial
productivity is increasing, labor as a producer gets none of the
rewards of higher productivity. (As a consumer, of course,
manufacturing labor would gain, if the higher productivity
25 The comprehensive biennial recordsavaikLblein Census compilations
throw light on these changes, during the recession. In 1929 total
wage disbursements constituted 16.5 per cent cf the gross income of manu-
facturing industries. By 1931this percentage had increased to17.4. This
change is in accord with past experience. By 1933, however, the percentage
had dropped again to i6.8. Liquidation of wages lagged behind the general
process of liquidation during the first two yea:s of recession, but thereafter
the reduction of wages was speeded up. By 1993 wage payments constituted
only a slightly larger fractional part of the gross income of manufacturing
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were reflected in lower selling prices.) If labor costs per unit
of goods produced remain constant when industrial produc-
tivity is increasing, manufacturing labor, as a producer, gets
rewards of higher productivity in the form of higher pay.
If the real selling prices of manufactured goods fail to fall,
at such a time, the benefits of the increased productivity are
not being passed on to consumers generally. (Agents of pro-
duction other than labor are almost certain, of course, to
gain, also.)
If we compare February—March 1936 with June—July
1929, we find a notable increase in productivity (probably
exceeding 25 per cent per man hour), real labor costs per
unit of product somewhat higher than in 1929,
higher real rates of pay, per hour of work done, and an
actual advance in the real prices at which manufactured
goods exchange for other goods. In place of the reduction
of real production costs and real selling prices that was to
be expected in manufacturing industries, in view of the
substantial increase in industrial productivity between June
1929 and March 1936, those costs and prices had, advanced.
At a time when the strongest considerations relating to gen-
eral recovery called for lower selling prices, these prices were
maintained at levels above those prevailing for commodities
in general.
There is some analogy between the situation prevailing in
manufacturing industries from 1933 to 1936 and that which
prevailed from 1922 to 1929.26 From 1922 to 1929 profits and
overhead charges were maintained at high levels, and the sell-
ing prices of manufactured goods failed to decline, to a
degree commensurate with the increase in industrial produc-
tivity and the fall in labor costs during that period. This
26SeeEconomic Tendencies in the United States, Ch. VIII.352 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
situation tended to reduce marketings and so contributed
to the unstable situation existing in 1929.Therise in time
rates of pay and in total wage payments in 1933—36, and the
failure of overhead and fabricational costs to reflect the great
gain in productivity that had occurred since 1929,helped
to perpetuate relatively high prices for manufactured goods.
(The fabricational costs which thus remained high were
not restricted to labor costs. The :Eact that labor costs did
no more than parallel changes in selling prices, when mate-
rial costs were relatively low, indicates that other fabrica-
tional charges, such as overhead costs, remained on the same
high level as labor costs.) The advance in the prices of these
goods, at a time when such goods were already over-valued,
retarded a needed in the volume of sales. During
the decade of the 'twenties a high manufacturing differential
(profits are here included with the differential) was a factor
in preventing the maintenance of a large volume of pro-
duction and sales. From 1933to1936ahigh manufacturing
differential was a factor in prevenl:ing the restoration of a
large volume of production and sales.
We are far from knowing all the conditions essential to the
steady and efficient operation of a modern industrial econ-
omy. But experience during the last ten years seems to justify
one general conclusion. The immediate passing on to con-
sumers of a major part of the benefit of increasing industrial
productivity, in the form of lower prices, contributes directly
to the maintenance of industrial operations on a high level
and to the raisingof the standard cf living of the people at
large. Action designed to procure for special groups the
advantages of increasing industrial productivity, or action
tending to decrease industrial productivity and advance
costs, runs the grave danger of defeating its own purpose,
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tion) of the volume of production and employment that is
essential to the general welfare.21
21Thesection of this chapter that deals with the operations of manuFactur-
ing industries during recovery, and the main parts of the summary, were
published as Bulletin 56 of the National Bureau of Economic Research on
May io, 1935.